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Introduction: Hobbes's life in philosophy 
With this third and concluding volume, I turn from Renaissance theories of self-government to their leading philosophical opponent, Thomas Hobbes. As we shall see, Hobbes was nurtured in the humanist ideals with which I was chiefly concerned in volume . But he went on to repudiate his upbringing and, in developing his theories of freedom, obligation and the state, he sought to discredit and supersede some of the most fundamental tenets of humanist political thought. Reacting above all against the Renaissance predilection for self-governing cityrepublics, he constructed a theory of absolute sovereignty grounded on a covenant specifically requiring that each one of us 'give up my Right of Governing my selfe'.
 The aim of this Introduction will be to trace the process by which Hobbes arrived at these anti-humanist commitments, to examine the resulting elements in his civil science and to consider their place in his more general scheme of the sciences.

To begin at the beginning. Thomas Hobbes was born on  April  in Westport, a parish adjoining the town of Malmesbury in Wiltshire.
 He was the second son of another Thomas Hobbes,  curate of the neighbouring and all too aptly named parish of Brokenborough.
 The elder Hobbes appears to have found his life altogether too much for him. A  Hobbes , ch. , p. .
 Aubrey , vol. , pp. , .  Aubrey , vol. , pp.  and - notes that Edmund, brother of Hobbes père, was his elder by two years.  Aubrey , vol. , p.  wrongly describes Hobbes's father as vicar of Westport. Malcolm , pp. ,  corrects the mistake. Malcolm also notes (p. ) that Brokenborough was one of the poorest livings in the area. Malcolm's article is of exceptional value and I am greatly indebted to it.
 
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man of little education who could barely read the church services,  he played cards all night, fell asleep during the sermon,  became notorious for drunken and quarrelsome behaviour  and eventually fled to London in  after picking a fight with another local clergyman.
 It is not known whether his famous son ever saw him again.
Hobbes's father was succeeded in the curacy of Brokenborough by a man in his late twenties called Robert Latimer,  who was destined to play a more formative role in shaping the young Hobbes's life than his own father ever seems to have done. A graduate of Magdalen Hall, Oxford,  Latimer had arrived at Westport directly from university in the mid-s to run a small private school.
 Hobbes attended this establishment from about the age of ten,  and it is a fact of great importance in Hobbes's intellectual development that Robert Latimer was able to provide him with an excellent grounding in the humanistic curriculum then typical of the Elizabethan grammar schools.
 This training mainly centred on the study of the classical languages, and the young Hobbes duly succeeded (as we shall see in chapter ) in acquiring an extraordinarily high level of proficiency in Latin and Greek. But the study of classical rhetoric would also have formed a significant part of his education, and this too is important (as we shall see in chapter ) in relation to explaining the evolution of his thought. Hobbes makes no mention of Latimer in either of his autobiographies,  but he undoubtedly owed his schoolmaster a major intellectual debt.
 So says Aubrey , vol. , p. , who also speaks of his 'ignorance and clownery'.  Aubrey , vol. , p. .  Aubrey , vol. , p. . Cf. Malcolm , p. .  See Aubrey , vol. , p.  for the incident and Malcolm , p.  for the date.  Malcolm , p.  has established this fascinating fact. I infer Latimer's age at the time from the fact that, according to Aubrey , vol. , p. , Latimer was 'a young man of about nineteen or twenty' when Hobbes began attending his school in the late s. But Latimer may have been older than Aubrey supposed. Foster -, vol. , p.  records that Latimer took his BA at Magdalen Hall as early as , proceeding to an MA at Magdalen College in .  Foster  -, vol. , p. . Cf. Malcolm , p. .  Aubrey , vol. , p. .  This can be inferred from the fact that, as Aubrey , vol. , p.  informs us, after finishing his 'petty' training at the church school in Westport at the age of eight, Hobbes attended a school run by the minister in Malmesbury before moving to Latimer's establishment.  For this curriculum see Skinner , pp. -.  It will be best to say a word about Hobbes's autobiographies at the outset, given that they provide such important insights into his career, and will be frequently cited not merely in the present Introduction but in several later chapters. Hobbes tells us in Hobbes b, p. xcix, line  that he wrote his verse Vita, much the longer of his two autobiographical sketches, at the age of eighty-four -that is, in . Hobbes MSS (Chatsworth) MS A.  is Hobbes's corrected manuscript copy, and provides a more authoritative text than Hobbes b, the version printed by Molesworth. I have therefore preferred to quote from the Chatsworth manuscript, although  As a younger son, Hobbes may have been intended for the church,

and this may help to explain how it came about that his father's elder brother, a childless and prosperous glover, agreed to pay for Hobbes to be sent to university.  No doubt as a result of Latimer's advice, Hobbes followed in his teacher's footsteps and went to Magdalen Hall Oxford, where he took his bachelor's degree in .
 But instead of seeking ecclesiastical preferment he immediately followed the no less time-honoured path of joining an aristocratic household. As soon as he graduated, he entered the service of William Cavendish, a Derbyshire landowner who became the first Earl of Devonshire in . Hobbes's initial duties were those of tutor and companion to Cavendish's son, the future second earl, who also bore the name William Cavendish.
 Subsequently, Hobbes went on to act as secretary to the younger Cavendish,  but reverted to his tutorial role soon after the second earl's sudden death in .
 The third earl -yet another William Cavendish -was barely eleven years old at the time,  and Hobbes was asked to take charge of his education, a task that occupied him for seven painstaking years (as he put it in his verse Vita) until Cavendish attained his majority in .

It is important to underline the extent to which, as this sketch already indicates, Hobbes was a product of the literary culture of humanism. As we shall see in chapter , the values of the studia humanitatis largely underpin the syllabus he worked out for the instruction of the third earl in the s. Hobbes himself draws attention to the point when referring to his tutorial labours in his verse Vita. Although he mentions that he taught the young earl some logic, arithmetic and geography,  he stresses that they mainly concentrated on the three basic elements of the studia humanitatis: grammar, rhetoric and poetry. They began 'by learning the meaning of the speech used by the Romans, and how to join Latin words my page references are to the Molesworth edition. Tricaud , pp. - has established that Hobbes's shorter prose Vita was partly drafted in the s and given its final form only a few months before his death in .  As I seek to demonstrate in chapter , it is wholly constructed according to the precepts laid down in classical handbooks of rhetoric for the presentation of persuasive arguments, as well as being founded on the humanist assumption that 'the principal and proper work of history' is 'to instruct and enable men, by the knowledge of actions past, to bear themselves prudently in the present and providently towards the future'.
 
During the s Hobbes began to direct his intellectual energies along new paths. He began to turn away from -and against -his humanist allegiances, and to take an increasingly professional interest in the study of mathematics and the natural sciences. Hobbes's correspondence from this period suggests that his scientific curiosity was quickened as a result of his acquaintance with the Earl of Devonshire's cousins, the Earl of Newcastle and his younger brother Sir Charles Cavendish, both of whom were conducting experiments at the earl's principal residence, Welbeck Abbey in Nottinghamshire.
 By  we find Hobbes writing confidently to Newcastle on a variety of scientific themes. He offers an opinion about local motion and its relation to heat, about Galileo's theory of colour and light, and more generally about the nature of scientific proof.
 He also discusses the optical experiments being carried out at Welbeck by Robert Payne, who soon became a close friend.
 Payne was employed by Newcastle nominally as his chaplain, but devoted much of his time in the mid-s to studying the phenomenon of refracted light, a subject that rapidly attracted Hobbes's attention as well.

Hobbes's shift from the humanities to the sciences appears to have happened rather suddenly. So it seems natural to ask whether the moment of conversion can be pinpointed with any accuracy. Hobbes himself supplies a very precise date. Accused of plagiarism at one point in his bruising controversy with Descartes in , he retorted that he had first articulated his theories about 'the nature and production of light, sound and all phantasms or ideas' in the presence of 'those most excellent brothers William Earl of Newcastle and Sir Charles Cavendish' as early as the year .
 It seems to have been this declaration that prompted Ferdinand Tönnies to attribute to Hobbes, and to date to the year , an anonymous manuscript to which Tönnies gave the title A Short Tract on First Principles.
 The authorship of the Short Tract has of late been a subject of intense debate,  but it is certainly clear that the ideas it contains are at least partly those of Hobbes.
 Although it includes some claims that Hobbes was subsequently to repudiate,  it is written in his familiar demonstrative style and contributes to his long-standing ambition to outline a purely mechanistic conception of nature.
The  These meetings appear to have aroused in Hobbes an almost obsessional desire to understand the laws of physics, and above all the phenomenon of motion. In his verse Vita he recalls that, after setting out for Italy with the young earl in the autumn of ,  'I began to think about the nature of things all the time, whether I was on a ship, in a coach, or travelling on horseback.'  He makes it clear that his thinking was based on a rejection of the Aristotelian assumption that the truth about the world must be closely connected with its appearance. On the contrary, Hobbes tells us, 'it seemed to me that there is only one thing in the whole world that is real, although it is falsified in a number of ways'.
 This single reality is motion, 'which is why anyone who wishes to understand physics must first of all devote themselves wholeheartedly to studying what makes motion possible'.

Back in England at the end of , Hobbes began to elaborate this basic insight as a claim about three types of bodies. 'The whole genus of philosophy', he came to believe, 'contains just three parts: Corpus, Homo, Civis, body, man and citizen.'
 Armed with these fundamental categories, he found himself able, he reports, 'to move from the various types of motion to the variety of things, that is, to different species and elements of matter, and from there to the internal motions of men and the secrets of the heart, and from there, finally, to the blessings of Sovereignty and Justice'.

With this outline firmly in mind, he goes on, 'I decided to write three books on these issues, and started to collect my materials every day.'  By the end of the s Hobbes had made considerable progress with this tripartite scheme. Admittedly there is little evidence that he had made much headway with the first of his projected volumes, De Corpore, which he finally managed to publish only in . But by  he had finished a major Latin manuscript treatise on optics,  the subject of the opening half of his second projected volume, De Homine, which eventually appeared in .
 And in May  he completed the manuscript of The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic, the latter part of which consists of a polished sketch of his promised third volume on the blessings of sovereignty and justice.

Soon after circulating this manuscript Hobbes begin to fear for his safety in consequence of the worsening political crisis in England. Forced to reconvene Parliament in  after a gap of eleven years, King Charles I found himself obliged to stand by while his advisers were arrested and his regime denounced. Among those sent to the Tower by parliamentary order was Roger Maynwaring, who had preached as royal chaplain in favour of the absolute power of kings.
  The full title signals the intended place of the work in Hobbes's tripartite division of philosophy, but the delays attending the completion of his trilogy proved so protracted that, when this final section was reissued in two further editions at Amsterdam in , it appeared instead under its shorter and more familiar title as De Cive.

One striking feature not merely of De Cive but of Hobbes's earlier sketch in The Elements of Law is the vehemence with which he repudiates the values of the rhetorical culture in which he had originally been nurtured. One of his principal purposes in both these works is to challenge and overturn the central tenets of Renaissance civil science and replace them with a new conception of scientia civilis founded on authentically scientific premisses. In chapters  and  I seek to illustrate these claims at greater length. In chapter  I begin by laying out the classical assumption that a civil science must be founded on a union of reason and rhetoric, and hence of science and eloquence. I then show how Hobbes sought to discredit and replace this approach by disjoining the science of politics from any connection with the rhetorical arts. In chapter  I turn to consider the fundamental rhetorical assumption that all moral questions are susceptible of being debated in utramque partem, on either side of the case. I seek to establish that one of Hobbes's leading aims as a moral philosopher was to undermine and supersede this style of argument by fixing the definitions and implications of moral terms in a purportedly scientific way.
After the publication of De Cive in , Hobbes reverted to working on his philosophical system in the order in which he had originally conceived 

After sketching this outline of his natural philosophy, Hobbes turned to the business of working it out in detail. An early outcome was Of Liberty and Necessity, which he composed in the form of a letter to the marquis (as he had become) of Newcastle in the summer of , having conducted a debate on the subject with John Bramhall in Newcastle's presence in Paris earlier in the same year.
 Pursuing an argument already implicit in the Short Tract,  and further developed in the analysis of deliberation in his Critique of White,  Hobbes provides an elegant solution to the problem of how to render metaphysical determinism compatible with the idea of free action. I examine his solution -which he subsequently incorporated into his civil philosophy -in the course of chapter .

The main project to which Hobbes devoted himself after finishing his critique of De Mundo was the completion of the opening volume in his projected trilogy.
 Recalling this period in his verse Vita, he remembered it as a time when 'I thought night and day for four years about the form of my book De Corpore and how it should be written'.
 It soon became clear, however, that the task he had set himself was even harder than he  For the manuscript see Bibliothèque Nationale, Fonds Latin MS A. For the dating see Jacquot and Jones , pp. had initially supposed. As he explained to friends who expressed anxiety about the lengthening delays, his main difficulty stemmed from his belief that in De Cive he had demonstrated all the leading propositions he had put forward. He was now trying, as he put it in a letter to Samuel Sorbière in June , 'to achieve in metaphysics and physics what I hope I have achieved in moral theory, so that there may be no room left for any critic to write against me'.  As he lamented in a subsequent letter, however, this was exactly the outcome that continued to elude him. 'It is not the effort of finding out the truth but that of explaining and demonstrating it which is holding up publication.'  One of Hobbes's stumbling blocks was that, as his Critique of White's De Mundo had already made painfully clear, he was unable to make up his mind about the character of a demonstrative science.
 He opens his Critique by arguing that the process of acquiring demonstrative knowledge is a matter of identifying causes and their necessary consequences.
 But he attempts at the same time to hold fast to the contrasting belief (already enunciated in The Elements of Law) that the 'steps of science' instead consist of tracing the implications of the meanings and definitions of terms.
 A still more intractable problem was that, even when Hobbes felt confident about the kinds of demonstrations he needed, he found it almost impossible to supply them to his own satisfaction, to say nothing of the satisfaction of his mathematical colleagues. He appears to have encountered this difficulty above all in Part  of De Corpore, and especially in chapter , which presents two alleged equations between straight and parabolic lines.
 As late as  he was still vainly wrestling with the proofs he had rashly committed himself to supplying in order to make good this part of his argument.

At some stage Hobbes decided to stop banging his head against this particular wall and returned to the study of civil science. The outcomethe magnificent yet ironic outcome -was that his stay in Paris failed to culminate in the long-promised completion of the opening section of his tripartite scheme of philosophy. 

Hobbes's Leviathan is often viewed as a continuation -even a vulgarisation -of a number of themes already present in De Cive and The Elements of Law. If we focus, however, on the central concept in each of these works -that of civil science itself -we come upon a sharp discontinuity. The earlier recensions of Hobbes's political theory had been grounded on the assumption that reason possesses an inherent power to persuade us of the truths it finds out, and thus that the arts of eloquence have no necessary place in civil science. In Leviathan, by contrast, we are told that 'the Sciences are small Power', and that they cannot hope to persuade us of the findings they enunciate.
 Hobbes now accepts in consequence that, if reason is to prevail, we shall need to supplement and enforce its findings by means of the rhetorical arts.
 This represents one of the most abrupt shifts of perspective in the evolution of his civil philosophy, and it forms the subject of chapter .
To say all this, however, is by no means to say (as some commentators have done) that Leviathan must be accounted a work of rhetoric as opposed to a work of science.
 Although Hobbes undoubtedly came to believe that the findings of civil science have little hope of being implemented or even credited without the aid of the rhetorical arts, he never abandoned his aspiration to construct what he describes in Leviathan as 'the science of Vertue and Vice'.
 His later statements of his political theory in consequence retain several elements of his earlier hostility to the basic tenets of classical and humanist scientia civilis. As I stress in chapter , he continues to speak out against the predilection of rhetoricians for generating moral ambiguity, and he responds with the same 'scientific' solution to the problem he had originally put forward in in The Elements of Law as the confusions inherent in the humanist vision of history as a teacher of wisdom.  As I point out in chapter , his later political writings not only embody a number of heterodox arguments about English constitutional history, but are grounded on the still more heterodox assumption that historical arguments have no legitimate place in a science of politics at all. Hobbes summarises this commitment in Behemoth, his dialogues on the civil wars,  when he insists that, even if we study the forms of ancient commonwealths in detail, we can never hope 'to derive from them any argument of Right, but onely examples of fact'.

To these considerations we need to add that, at some moments in Leviathan, Hobbes repudiates the ideals of classical and Renaissance political theory with even greater ferocity than in his earlier works. Perhaps the most important of these attacks is directed against the republican ideal of 'free states' and a number of associated arguments of a constitutionalist character. As we saw in volume  chapter , Renaissance political writers had begun to describe self-governing communities as states, stati orétats, and more specifically as stati liberi or free states. They tended as a result to equate the powers of the state with the powers of its citizens when viewed as an universitas or corporate body of people. As we shall see in chapter , Hobbes dramatically reverses this understanding, arguing that it is only when we perform the act of instituting a sovereign to represent us that we transform ourselves from a multitude of individuals into a unified body of people. He accordingly reserves the term civitas or state for the name of the artificial person we bring into existence when we authorise a sovereign both to represent us and to impersonate (or 'bear the Person of ') the state or commonwealth.

Hobbes had already spoken in The Elements of Law and De Cive of the civitas as an artificial person.
 As I shall argue in chapter , however, it is only in Leviathan that he formulates his theory of authorisation and makes the concept of 'bearing a person' the fulcrum of his theory of  For Hobbes's account of these alleged confusions see Skinner , pp. -.  Hobbes b remains the standard edition. The editor, Ferdinand Tonnies, used as his copy-text a manuscript fair-copied by Hobbes's amanuensis, James sovereignty.  Part  of Leviathan, 'Of Man', analyses the natural powers of persons, and culminates in the chapter entitled 'Of Persons, Authors, and things Personated'. This pivotal section examines the various ways in which we can represent ourselves under different guises -thereby adopting different personae -as well as permitting ourselves to be represented by other persons whose actions we authorise. This analysis leads directly into Part , 'Of Commonwealth', in which Hobbes goes on to explain the sovereign rights of the artificial person we bring into existence when we covenant as a multitude to choose a representative to act on our behalf, thereby instituting 'that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE'.
 As we saw in volume  chapter , it would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that, by placing the concept of artificial personality at the heart of his civil science, Hobbes closes one chapter in the history of the modern theory of the state and opens another and more familiar one. Arguably he is the earliest political writer to maintain with complete self-consciousness that the legal person lying at the heart of politics is neither the person of the sovereign nor the person constituted by the universitas of the people, but is rather the artificial person of the state.
Underlying Hobbes's attack on the ideal of free states is an idiosyncratic analysis of freedom itself. As we have seen, Hobbes had already presented his views on the metaphysics of freedom in his tract Of Liberty and Necessity in . It is only in the pages of Leviathan, however, that he fully pursues the political implications of his account. As we saw in volume  chapter , Roman and Renaissance theorists of the civitas had argued that one insidious way of producing unfreedom is by encouraging conditions of social and political dependence. The only way to avoid this predicament, they had argued, is to ensure that each and every citizen is given an equal voice in government. As Hobbes himself observes in The Elements of Law, one crucial implication of the argument is thus that individual liberty is possible only under conditions of self-rule: 'noe man can partake of Liberty, but onely in a Popular Commonwealth'.  I argue in chapter  that one of Hobbes's aspirations in Leviathan is to demolish this entire structure of thought, and with it the theory of equality and citizenship on which humanist civil science had been raised. Hobbes's response is rooted in his basic principle to the effect that nothing is real except matter in motion. The only sense we can assign to the idea  Zarka  excellently emphasises these developments.  Hobbes , p. .
 Hobbes a, p. .
of being unfree is therefore that it names the condition of a body whose movements have been obstructed or compelled. In the natural condition of mankind the ties capable of acting as such impediments are bonds or chains that literally prevent us from doing or forbearing at will. In the artificial condition of life within a Commonwealth we are further tied or bound by the artificial chains of the law, which prevent us by fear of evil consequences from acting anti-socially. For Hobbes, accordingly, the limits on our personal liberty are nothing to do with living in conditions of domination and dependence. They are simply the products of coercion: physical coercion by actual bonds in our natural state, moral coercion by the bonds of law in Commonwealths. For Hobbes there is nothing more to be said about the concept of individual liberty.

Throughout his period of exile from  to , Hobbes moved between his speculations about natural bodies and the reconsideration of his civil philosophy. It remains to ask how he apportioned his time between these two pursuits. Hobbes himself furnishes an unambiguous answer in the two autobiographies he composed in the s. As we have seen, his verse Vita informs us that he began by thinking for four years about the details of De Corpore. He goes on to add, however, that in the summer of  a number of events conspired to interrupt his train of thought. The young Prince of Wales and his retinue arrived at Paris in July, and soon afterwards Hobbes found himself called upon to act as tutor in mathematics to the prince.  Hobbes recalls that the exiled courtiers brought shocking news about the victories of Parliament in England and the growing disposition of the roundheads to regard their successes as a sign of God's providence. 'I could not bear', Hobbes declares 'to hear so many crimes attributed to the commands of God', and decided that 'although I had intended to write my book De Corpore, for which all the materials were ready, I would have to put it off '.
 The highest priority, he now felt, was 'to write something that would absolve  Cavendish to Pell,  December , BL Add MS  fo. the divine laws'.  He accordingly began to compose the treatise which, 'under the name of Leviathan, now fights on behalf of all kings and all those who under whatever name bear the rights of kings'.
 His prose Vita reiterates that, apart from the hours he spent tutoring his future king, this was the moment at which he began to devote himself full-time to the composition of Leviathan.

There is certainly some truth in Hobbes's later recollection that he shifted from natural to civil science in the course of . During the previous winter he had still been fully occupied with his physical speculations, and specifically with completing his English treatise on optics.

Of the two sections into which this manuscript is divided,  the first was finished and fair-copied by the beginning of November ,  but the second was only completed in the spring of .
 With this task out of the way, Hobbes undoubtedly turned his attention once more to political philosophy. The move was prompted by Samuel Sorbière, who came forward with the idea of a second edition of De Cive, offering to see a revised version through the press with the Amsterdam firm of Elzevir.

Hobbes responded to Sorbière's invitation in two ways.
 He composed a new Praefatio, publicising for the first time his proposed philosophical trilogy;
 and he inserted a large number of annotations into his text with the intention -as the Praefatio puts it -'of amending, softening and explaining anything that may have seemed erroneous, hard or obscure'.

Hobbes had already entered some of these corrections in his working copy of the  edition,  and it seems to have taken very little time to finish and copy them out. Writing to Sorbière on  May, he was already able to thank him for a letter praising the completed work.
 Although it took longer than expected for the second edition of De Cive to see the light,  Hobbes's active role in the project appears to have come to an end at this point.
Beyond this moment, however, such evidence as survives from the s tends to contradict Hobbes's own later account of the gestation of Leviathan, and to do so in a rather astonishing way.
 Having finished the revisions of De Cive, Hobbes seems to have returned at once to his interrupted labours on the opening section of his intended trilogy. His letter to Sorbière of  May  announces his imminent withdrawal from the distractions of Paris in the hope, he says, of devoting himself with greater freedom 'to finishing off the first part of my Elements'.
 By October he was giving his friends the impression that the treatise was well advanced. Charles Cavendish felt able to assure John Pell that, although Hobbes 'reades mathematickes sometimes to our Prince', he nevertheless 'hath spare time enough besides to goe on with his philosophie'.

Sorbière wrote to Gui Patin
 around the same time to say that 'I am avidly expecting the Elements of his entire philosophy and I am urging him to send me the whole work.'  Sorbière's expectations were destined to be disappointed, for in the course of the next twelve months Hobbes's life fell into one of its deepest troughs. He must already have been in difficulties in December , for we find Cavendish announcing in a further letter to Pell that he now expected Hobbes to take at least another year even to finish his physics.

By the summer of  things had gone from bad to worse, and Hobbes was forced by illness to stop work altogether. Mersenne wrote to Sorbière in early November to say that Hobbes had been contending with death for two or three months,  while Hobbes later recalled in his verse Vita that 'I was prostrated by illness for six months, and prepared myself for the approach of death'.  Although he began to recover at the end of ,  he never seems to have been the same man again. It was around this time, according to Aubrey, that he first began to suffer from 'the shaking palsey in his handes', a condition that left him virtually unable to write for the last two decades of his life.

As soon as Hobbes started to recover, he returned to working on De Corpore, the completion of which he soon began to talk about with renewed confidence. 'If the disease had not intervened', he told Sorbière in November , 'I should, I think, have completed the first part of my philosophy', but 'as things now are, you can expect to receive that part about Whitsun'.
 In August  a further bulletin from Cavendish to Pell included a similar note of assurance. 'M r : Hobbes hath nowe leasure to studie & I hope wee shall have his [philosophy] within a twelvemonth.'
 By  June  we find Hobbes writing to Sorbière that 'I think I am close enough to the end of the first part (which is both the largest part and the part which contains the deepest speculations) that I shall be able, God willing, to finish it before the end of this summer'.

He now felt so sure of attaining his goal that he started to have engravings made of the geometrical figures he needed for some of his proofs.

A further letter from Cavendish to Pell in October  implied that Hobbes's book was virtually done, and would actually be in print by the spring of the coming year.

It may be that these references amount to nothing more than a smokescreen, and that Hobbes decided to keep the generation of his great  Hobbes b, p. xcii, lines -:
that it had succeeded in bringing about a peaceful settlement. The grand case of conscience raised by the events of  was accordingly whether the capacity of the new regime to offer peace and protection should be taken to constitute a sufficient reason for swearing allegiance to it.

Hobbes believed that in Leviathan he had articulated a theory of political obligation capable of offering comfort to surviving royalists and all other waverers on these very points. As I argue in chapter , the essence of his theory is that 'the Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them'.
 The application of this principle, Hobbes maintains, will serve in the first place to resolve the question of whether it is lawful to compound for one's estates. If a subject is 'protected by the adverse party for his Contribution', he should recognise that, since 'such contribution is every where, as a thing inevitable, (not withstanding it be an assistance to the Enemy,) esteemed lawfull; a totall Submission, which is but an assistance to the Enemy, cannot be esteemed unlawful'. To which he adds the ingenious claim that those who refuse to compound, and consequently forfeit their estates, do more harm to the loyalist cause than those who submit. This is because 'if a man consider that they who submit, assist the enemy with but part of their estates, whereas they that refuse, assist him with the whole, there is no reason to call their Submission, or Composition an Assistance; but rather a Detriment to the Enemy'.

Of more importance, Hobbes goes on, is the fact that his basic argument serves to settle the question of whether it is lawful to 'engage'. As I emphasise in chapter , Hobbes informs us in his Review and Conclusion that the writing of Leviathan was 'occasioned by the disorders of the present time' and undertaken 'without other designe, than to set before mens eyes the mutuall Relation between Protection and Obedience'.

One aspect of this reciprocity is that, if you are no longer protected by your lawful sovereign, then your obligations are at an end. The corollary is that, if you are offered peace and protection -even by mere conquerors -you have a sufficient reason for paying allegiance as a true subject. Hobbes's fundamental principle, as he states it in chapter , is that 'The end of Obedience is Protection; which, wheresoever a man  For an excellent discussion of the relevance of these events see Sommerville , pp. -.  Hobbes , ch. , p.  and Conclusion, p. .  Hobbes , Conclusion, pp. -.
 Hobbes , Conclusion, p. .
